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Coevolution Is Everywhere

Theoretical Model (Type-Interaction)

Our Statistical Model (Spatial-Logit + P-Star)

Coevolution is:

Purpose of the Theoretical Model

[ Discrete-Time Markov Model ]

Examples in political science:
Networks

Behavior

Peer groups
Cosponsorship
Party coalitions
Alliances

Political behavior
Legislative behavior
Manifesto content
Conflict behavior

• A simple model to derive conditions under which systems have multiple equilibria.

P r(typei,t = 1) = logit(β0 + β1 typei,t−1 + β2 W · typet−1 ).

• As stated in Page (2007), the potential for multiple equilibria is important:
1. The set of conditions for multiple equilibria is a reasonable measure of
systemic complexity.
2. Allows us to analyze how initial/past states affect the attainment of one of
the equilibria. = A simple model of phat/path-dependent processes.

Coevolution and Multiple Steady States

• To explain the behavioral-type switching, a simple spatial-logit model

• To explain the tie-formation, a simple p-star model (independent dyads)
P r(tiedyad−i,t = 1) = logit(γ0 + γ1 tiedyad−i,t−1 + γ2 I(type matcht )),
where I(type matcht ) indicates whether the types in the given dyad were the same in the
previous period. The term captures “homophily".

⇒ Estimated β̂2 and γ̂2 indicate the existence of coevolutionary dynamics.

Type-Interaction Model

NB: SIENA (Snijders et al.) = Continuous-time Markov model.
What about the long-run characteristics of systems with coevolution?
• Consider a longitudinal process where N actors choose behavior in each time
period t.

Application

• Define state (roughly) by the set of outcome-behaviors of all the actors.

Alliances and the Conflict Behavior of Major Powers (1900-1950)

• We can define the equilibrium of the system as the steady-state distribution of
N actors’ types.

[Markov Model]

I Our goal (1): Establish theoretically that systems with coevolution can more
easily generate multiple equilibria than systems without coevolution.
(Due to violation of assumptions for the Ergodic Theorm.)
I Our goal (1’): Establish theoretically that systems with coevolution are more
likely history-dependent than systems without coevolution.
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where z’s are polynomials of a and b.
⇒ Multiple steady-states (where at+1 = at and bt+1 = bt ) for a and b.

Discrete-Time (MATLAB)
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• (1) Evidence of heterophily–pacific powers are more likely to ally with aggressive
powers, and (2) conflict behavior diffuses through alliances.

Rigorous definitions of “history matters".
• 3 Types of History-Dependent processes (Page 2006):
1. State dependence: the outcome at t depends only on the currently observable state, implying Markov processes.
2. “Phat" dependence: the outcome at t depends on the past states (history) but the order of past states doesn’t matter.
3. Path dependence: the outcome at t depends on the past states and the
sequence of the past states.
I Our goal (2): Assess the empirical significance of coevolutionary political dynamics.

Take-Away Points (Theory)
Key Finding & Claim
• With coevolution, a very simple type-interaction model (with deterministic outcome rules) can generate multiple equilibria.
• If the coevolutionary dynamic exist in given data (= an empirical question), then
the system is most likely phat/path-dependent, b/c the type-switching probabilities are changing over time.
Comparison with Page (2007)’s "Rule of Six"

I Our goal (3): Develop an empirical strategy to estimate and evaluate historydependence, merging the theoretical and empirical models of coevolution.

• Page derives, in his non-coevolutionary interaction model, that at least 3 types
are necessary for a system of 3 actors to have multiple equilibria, if the outcomerules are deterministic. Hence the “rule of six" (3+3).
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Where to Go with This?
• An important and difficult empirical question arises;
To what extent does history matter?–How sensitive are equilibrium distributions to the past states?)

Take-Away Points (Empirical Strategy)
• The combined spatial-logit and p-star (ERGM) model provides a relatively simple way to assess the empirical significance of coevolutionary dynamics.
• The combined spatial-logit and p-star (ERGM) model is directly related to the
theoretical Markov interaction model.
⇒ This connection is crucial to analyze empirically history dependence.
• Connecting theory and empirics would be much more difficult in a continuous
-time framework.

Empirical Analyses of History Dependence
Next Steps
• Short Run: To add stochastic outcome rules to the theoretical model in form
conducive to generating the statistical model.
• Medium Run: To theorize more fully the relationship between multiple equilibria
and history dependence.
• Long Run: To develop statistical tests for various types for history dependence,
including path dependence.

